Bromwell v. Michigan Mutual Ins by unknown
1997 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-6-1997 
Bromwell v. Michigan Mutual Ins 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997 
Recommended Citation 
"Bromwell v. Michigan Mutual Ins" (1997). 1997 Decisions. 121. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997/121 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1997 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed June 6, 1997 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 




WILLIAM DAVID BROMWELL, Personal Representative of 
the Estate of ELIZABETH NAOMI BROMWELL, Deceased; 
JOHN DARROW, SR., Personal Representative of the 
Estate of JOHN DARROW, JR., Deceased; and ORMAND 
KEITH ADAMS and MITCHELL J. CORNWELL, Personal 
Representatives of the Estate of BRIAN KENT ADAMS, 






MICHIGAN MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and 
MICHIGAN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE PLACEMENT 
COMPANY, 
 
Appeal from a Memorandum Order of the 
United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
Civil Action No. 94-1696 
 
Argued January 10, 1997 
 
Before: COWEN, ALITO, and ROSENN, Circuit Judges  
 
Filed June 6, 1997 
 
 
William A. Loftus, Esq. (Argued) 
Shrager, McDaid, Loftus, Flum & 
 Spivey 
2001 Market Street 
32nd Floor, Two Commerce Square 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
Daniel M. Berger, Esq. 
Berger Law Firm 
Frick Building 
Suite 912 
Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
Counsel for Appellants 
 
L. John Argento, Esq. 
Michael F. Nerone, Esq. 
Stephen R. Mlinac, Esq. (Argued) 
Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote 
Two PPG Place 
Suite 400 
Pittsburgh, PA 15222-5402 
Counsel for Appellees 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal, having wended a tortured procedural path to 
arrive finally at this court, raises an interesting issue 
concerning the extent of a federal court's jurisdiction: 
whether a federal district court, having previously 
dismissed an action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, 
could properly exert jurisdiction over an identical state 
court action removed to that federal court by the 
defendants on diversity grounds. Having considered the 
jurisdictional limitations imposed on a federal court by 
statutory law and the doctrine of res judicata, we hold that 
the district court is precluded from exercising further 
jurisdiction over that claim and must remand the case to 
the state court from which it was removed. 
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I. 
 
The current litigation arose out of a tragic accident that 
occurred at the Breezewood Interchange of the 
Pennsylvania Turnpike on June 17, 1990. A tractor-trailer 
owned by Ralph Meyers Trucking, Inc. ("Meyers Trucking") 
and operated by David A. Stacey "rear-ended" a motorcycle 
operated by Brian Kent Adams, on which Elizabeth Naomi 
Bromwell was a passenger, and then "rear-ended" a second 
motorcycle operated by John Darrow, Jr. Stacey's truck 
pushed the two motorcycles into the rear of another 
tractor-trailer, driven by Pete L. Wurm. The three 
motorcyclists, Adams, Bromwell, and Darrow, were killed in 
the collision and Wurm suffered serious physical and 
psychological injuries. 
 
Representatives of the estates of the three deceased 
motorcyclists individually brought actions against Meyers 
Trucking and Stacey for wrongful death and negligence; 
Wurm brought an action against Meyers Trucking and 
Stacey for negligence. These actions were filed in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania and were consolidated into a single case, with 
jurisdiction premised on diversity grounds pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332. Both Meyers Trucking and Stacey are 
citizens of Michigan, Wurm is a citizen of Missouri, and the 
three decedents were citizens of Maryland. 
 
On January 27, 1992, the district court granted a motion 
for partial summary judgment filed by the estate 
representatives and Wurm (hereinafter collectively referred 
to as "Appellants") on the issue of liability. The Appellants 
subsequently entered into a settlement agreement and 
release with Meyers Trucking's insurers, Michigan Mutual 
Insurance Company and Michigan Automobile Insurance 
Placement Facility (hereinafter referred to collectively as 
"Appellees"). The terms of the settlement agreement are, in 
pertinent part: 
 
 For and in consideration of the sum of Seven 
Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars ($750,000.00) 
plus whatever other liability insurance coverage that 
may be declared available by judgment of any Court as 
the result of any Declaratory Judgment action now 
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pending or to be filed . . . hereby fully and forever 
release, acquit and discharge Ralph Meyers Trucking, 
Inc. and David Stacey to the full extent of their 
personal and/or corporate liability (while at the same 
time preserving our rights to pursue to the full extent 
possible the limits of insurance coverage available to 
either David Stacey and/or Ralph Meyers Tucking, Inc. 
pursuant to policies of insurance issued by Michigan 
Mutual and Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement 
Facility, the extent of said coverage having been placed 
at issue in the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania at Civil Actions Nos. 92-0183 
and 92-1172 and/or which may be placed in issue in 
another court of competent jurisdiction) from any and 
all actions . . . by John Darrow, Jr., Elizabeth Naomi 
Bromwell, Pete L. Wurm, and Brian Kent Adams or our 
property sustained or received on or about the 17th 
day of June, 1990 when a vehicular accident occurred 
in the vicinity of the Breezewood Interchange of the 
Pennsylvania Turnpike for which injuries, losses and 
damages we claim Ralph Meyers Trucking, Inc. and 
David Stacey to be legally liable and on account of 
which suit was brought in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania at Civil 
Actions Nos. 90-1120, 90-1608, and 91-1154, it being 
understood and agreed that the acceptance of said sum 
is in full accord and satisfaction of a disputed claim 
and that the payment of said sum is not an admission 
of liability by Ralph Meyers Trucking, Inc. and David 
Stacey. 
 
The agreement further addressed the pending declaratory 
judgment action brought by the Appellants against the 
Appellees, stating: 
 
 It is further agreed and understood that this release 
and settlement agreement is not intended to 
compromise, reduce or in any way affect the continued 
prosecution or outcome of the Declaratory Judgment 
Actions filed by us and Michigan Mutual Insurance 
Company/Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement 
Facility at Nos. 92-0183 and 92-1172 in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of 
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Pennsylvania or of any other Declaratory Judgment 
action that may be filed or of any appeals that may be 
taken therefrom. It is further agreed and understood by 
the parties hereto that the within Settlement 
Agreement and Release will not be raised as a defense 
in any Declaratory Judgment action. It is also 
acknowledged that all parties hereto retain their right 
to appeal any judgment reached in any Declaratory 
Action. 
 
The district court entered an order on August 13, 1993, 
approving this settlement agreement and dismissing the 
action "without prejudice to any claims which may arise 
under the settlement agreement." No order was issued with 
regard to the district court's previous grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the Appellants on the issue of liability. 
 
At the time the district court dismissed this matter, two 
additional actions were pending in federal court. The 
Appellants had filed a complaint in the United States 
District Court against Meyers Trucking and Stacey, seeking 
a declaratory judgment pursuant to the Federal Declaratory 
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. In this action, the 
Appellants sought a declaration that the incident which 
occurred on June 17, 1990, constituted three separate 
accidents, and therefore the available liability insurance 
coverage would be $2,250,000 and not the $750,000 
available for a single accident. The district court dismissed 
this action against Meyers Trucking and Stacey for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction. The action concerned only the 
scope of the available insurance coverage and thus 
realigned Meyers Trucking and Stacey with the Appellants 
against the Appellees. Since Meyers Trucking, Stacey, and 
the Appellees are all Michigan residents, the realignment 
destroyed diversity of citizenship. No other basis for federal 
court jurisdiction existed in that action. 
 
The Appellees brought the second action against the 
Appellants, Meyers Trucking, and Stacey. This complaint 
purported to raise a federal question but the gravamen of 
the declaratory judgment action was the interpretation of 
the term "accident" in the insurance policy. The district 
court dismissed this action for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction, concluding that the Appellees were precluded 
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from bringing this action because there was no underlying 
judgment of liability, a prerequisite to the only possible 
claim under federal law. 
 
Following the dismissal of their action, the Appellants 
filed a Motion to Reconsider, which the district court 
denied. The court concluded that the error in pleadings 
that led to the initial dismissal had not been corrected. 
Additionally, the court stated that "[i]f this Court has 
subject matter jurisdiction over the parties' dispute, one or 
more of the parties must have an action for coercive relief-- 
damages in this case--against the others." Darrow v. Ralph 
Meyers Trucking, Inc., C.A. No. 92-183, mem. order at 3 
(W.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 1993). The court then granted the 
Appellants leave to amend the complaint. The Appellants 
chose, however, to file a second declaratory judgment 
action in the federal district court. 
 
The Appellants filed this second declaratory judgment 
action against only the Appellees; Meyers Trucking and 
Stacey were not parties to the action. The Appellants 
premised jurisdiction on diversity grounds, and diversity 
was not defeated due to a realignment of the parties, as 
had occurred in the previous action. The district court 
again dismissed the action without prejudice, however, this 
time for failure to allege a "case or controversy" sufficient to 
invoke the federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction under 
the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act. The court concluded 
that both "the claim and counterclaim in the present action 
do not contain within them a justiciable controversy." 
Bromwell et al. v. Michigan Mutual Insur. Co. et al. , C.A. No. 
93-1602, mem. op. at 16 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 1994). Again, 
the district court focused on the absence of an underlying 
judgment as the main bar to prosecution of this complaint 
and the accompanying counterclaims. Thus, the court 
dismissed the Appellants' complaint and the Appellees' 
counterclaims without prejudice. 
 
Rather than appeal the district court's decision to 
dismiss their complaint without prejudice, the Appellants 
filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Bedford 
County, Pennsylvania. This complaint repled the same 
request for declaratory relief concerning the definition of the 
term "accident" in the insurance policy as was raised in the 
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federal district court. Additionally, this state law action 
sought a declaration that there was separate liability 
coverage on both the tractor and on the trailer. The 
Appellants later dropped their first contention that there 
were three separate accidents under the terms of the 
insurance policy. They proceeded only on their claim that 
the tractor and the trailer were separate vehicles under 
both the insurance policy and federal law and that 
therefore each was covered for $750,000 under the terms of 
the policy, and each injured party was entitled to a total of 
$1,500,000.00. 
 
The Appellees removed this case to the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania and 
moved to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim on 
which relief could be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Appellantsfiled a 
motion to remand the matter back to state court. 
Magistrate Judge Francis X. Caiazza issued a Report and 
Recommendation advising the district court to deny the 
motion to remand and to determine the justiciability of the 
claim under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act. District 
Court Judge Robert J. Cindrich adopted the Report and 
Recommendation as the opinion of the district court. 
 
Judge Caiazza issued a second report and 
recommendation on the matter, recommending that the 
Appellees' motion to dismiss should be granted for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction. The court adopted this report 
and recommendation as the opinion of the court and 
ordered that the Appellants' complaint be dismissed. The 
court also held there was no subject matter jurisdiction for 
a Pennsylvania court under the Pennsylvania Declaratory 
Judgments Act. The Appellants brought this timely appeal, 
arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction over this 
case as a matter of res judicata and that the court therefore 




This court exercises plenary review over jurisdictional 
issues. Anthuis v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp. , 971 F.2d 
999, 1002 (3d Cir. 1992). In the present matter, the 
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Appellants assert that the district court erred in exercising 
jurisdiction over the removed complaint, originallyfiled in 
state court, because the federal court had previously 
determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over 
an identical claim brought by the Appellants in the federal 
court. Additionally, the Appellants assert that the district 
court erred when, upon concluding that it lacked subject- 
matter jurisdiction over the removed state court action, it 
dismissed the action rather than remand it to the state 
court. The Appellants first propose that the district court 
erred in its March 28, 1994, order dismissing their 
complaint for failing to raise a justiciable claim. The 
correctness of the district court's order is not properly 
before this court at the present time. The Appellants failed 
to file a timely appeal of this decision, choosing instead to 
bring a new, albeit identical, claim in state court. Therefore, 
the district court's decision is final and the matter cannot 
now be challenged as part of this appeal. 
 
The gravamen of the Appellants' reviewable argument is 
that the district court improperly exercised jurisdiction over 
their state law claim when the Appellees removed the 
matter to the federal court, and that the district court 
further erred by not remanding the matter to the state 
court once it concluded that it lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction over the dispute. The existence of subject- 
matter jurisdiction over an action is a prerequisite to its 
removal to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441; Brown v. 
Francis, 75 F.3d 860, 864-65 (3d Cir. 1996). Section 1441 
states that "any civil action brought in a State court of 
which the district courts of the United States have original 
jurisdiction, may be removed . . . to the district court of the 
United States for the district and division embracing the 
place where such action is pending." In its March 28, 1994 
order, the district court dismissed the Appellants' action 
after concluding that the Appellants had not presented a 
justiciable claim under the Federal Declaratory Judgment 
Act. 
 
Once the court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over 
the matter in its March 28, 1994 order, that determination 
had a preclusive effect. "A dismissal for lack of subject- 
matter jurisdiction, while `not binding as to all matters 
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which could have been raised,' is, however, conclusive as to 
matters actually adjudged." Equitable Trust Co. v. 
Commodity Futures Comm'n, 669 F.2d 269, 272 (5th Cir. 
1982) (quoting Acree v. Airline Pilot Ass'n, 390 F.2d 199, 
203 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 852, 89 S. Ct. 88, 21 
L.Ed.2d 122 (1968)). In the present matter, the issue of 
whether a justiciable claim was presented under the 
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act had previously been 
adjudicated in the March 28, 1994 order. The facts 
underlying the state law claim are identical to those 
underlying the previously dismissed federal court action. 
The Appellants had not obtained any judgment of liability 
in the interim, the lack of which presented the basis for the 
district court's original determination that there was no 
subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Once the 
matter was removed to the federal district court by the 
Appellees, the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act again 
governed the justiciability of the Appellants' claim. The 
district court, having previously determined that it lacked 
subject-matter jurisdiction over the Appellants' case, was 
precluded by the principles of res judicata from exercising 
jurisdiction over this matter once it was removed by the 
Appellees. Thus, the district court simply could not exercise 
jurisdiction over the matter. 
 
Upon a determination that a federal court lacks subject- 
matter jurisdiction over a particular action, the plain 
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) mandates that the matter 
be remanded to the state court from which it was removed. 
Section 1447(c) states: "If at any time beforefinal judgment 
it appears that the district court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." The language of 
this section is mandatory -- once the federal court 
determines that it lacks jurisdiction, it must remand the 
case back to the appropriate state court. International 
Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. 
Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 87 (1991); Maine Assoc. of 
Interdependent Neighborhoods v. Commissioner, Maine Dep't 
of Human Svcs., 876 F.2d 1051, 1054 (1st Cir. 1989). 
Therefore, the district court erred when it dismissed the 
matter rather than remand it to the state court. 
 
The Appellees contend that the district court did not err 
in dismissing the matter under the "futility exception" to 
 
                                9 
§ 1447(c), which allows a district court to dismiss an action 
rather than remand it to the state court when remand 
would be futile because the state court also would lack 
jurisdiction over the matter. This court has never 
recognized the futility exception, and the Supreme Court 
has, in dicta, expressed a reluctance to recognize such 
discretion under the removal statute. See International 
Primate, 500 U.S. at 89 (noting that literal words of 
§ 1447(c) grant district court no discretion to dismiss 
matter). Thus, we turn to the case law of other circuits to 
consider the merits of this proposed exception. 
 
This proposed "futility exception," a relatively new 
concept, has been recognized only by the Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits. See Bell v. City of Kellog, 922 F.2d 1418, 1425 
(9th Cir. 1991) (ruling that dismissal was appropriate where 
remand was futile); Arasco, Inc. v. Glenara, Ltd., 912 F.2d 
784, 787 (5th Cir. 1990) (permitting dismissal where 
remand would be futile because federal court's 
determination that state court lacked jurisdiction bound 
state court). However, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits 
have both expressly rejected the existence of this futility 
exception. See Roach v. West Virginia Reg'l Jail & 
Correctional Facility Auth., 74 F.3d 46, 49 (4th Cir. 1996) 
(noting that "the futility of a remand to the West Virginia 
state court does not provide an exception to the plain 
meaning of § 1447(c)"); Smith v. Wisconsin Dep't of 
Agriculture, 23 F.3d 1134, 1139 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing 
International Primate and stating that Supreme Court has 
"squarely rejected" any futility exception to§ 1447(c)). The 
Tenth Circuit has also expressly rejected this proposed 
exception in an unpublished opinion. Jepsen v. Texaco, 
Inc., 68 F.3d 483, 1995 WL 607630, at *3 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(noting that Supreme Court has expressly rejected futility 
exception in International Primate). Additionally, the First 
Circuit, while not expressly refusing to adopt the futility 
exception, stated that "the fact that we believe a certain 
legal result unlikely, as a matter of state law, is not 
sufficient grounds for reading an exception into the 
absolute statutory words "shall be remanded." Maine Ass'n, 
876 F.2d at 1055 (emphasis in original). Even the Second 
Circuit, which once indicated that it might consider the 
futility exception, Mignogna v. Sair Aviation, Inc., 937 F.2d 
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37, 41 (2d Cir. 1991), has recently recognized that such an 
exception probably does not exist in light of the Supreme 
Court's opinion in International Primate. Barbara v. New 
York Stock Exchange, 99 F.3d 49, 56 n.4 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 
In light of the express language of § 1447(c) and the 
Supreme Court's reasoning in International Primate, we 
hold that when a federal court has no jurisdiction of a case 
removed from a state court, it must remand and not 
dismiss on the ground of futility. Having concluded that no 
such exception exists, it is unnecessary for us to address 
the Appellees' argument that remand would be futile 
because the Appellants have also failed to raise a justiciable 
claim under state law. Once the district court determined 
that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the 
Appellants' claim, the district court was obligated to 
remand the matter to the state court under the express 
language of § 1447(c). Whether the matter is justiciable 




The order of the district court dismissing the Appellants' 
complaint is vacated and the matter is remanded to the 
district court with instructions to remand the case to the 
Court of Common Pleas of Bedford County, Pennsylvania. 
 
Each side to bear its own costs. 
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